Philosophy Discussion Post

** you would need to write on two questions, a longer one for the main discussion post and the other can be shorter. Please clearly identify which one is which. Below are the prompts from the professor’s email.

This week we’re in transition between Descartes’ Meditations, and Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. With this in mind, I’ve decided to include prompts on both (two on Descartes, one on Kant). As we already approached the text up to the Sixth Meditation last week, I’ve focused on the remaining section – the objections and replies. For Kant, I’ve focused on the Preface. In both cases, I’ve included more guidance questions than ordinary to assist you in reading the texts.

(1) In the section On Meditation Five of the book, we see (at AT VII 97, p. 97 of the book) an objection posed against the proof of God’s existence that is offered in the Fifth Meditation.

According to the objector, why can’t we infer that God actually exists, after establishing that existence belongs to (or is inseparable from) God’s essence? [AT VII 98-99; starting at p. 97 in the book]. What is Descartes’ response? [AT 115-119].

For the first part, you may find it helpful to review AT VII 323-325 (pp. 95-96; a related discussion from another objector). For the second part, you may find it helpful to start with AT VII 119, and then read 115 though 118 for the lead-up to that discussion.

Some guidance questions: What does it mean to say that something “exists in the apprehension of the intellect”? [AT VII 99]. Why does the objector claim that, even if existence is contained in the essence of a supremely perfect being, it does not follow that “the existence in question is anything actual in the world”? [AT VII 99]. Under what conditions, according to Descartes, can we establish that existence belongs to God’s essence? [AT VII 116]. What is the difficulty that remains at this point? [See discussion starting with, “Hence only the minor premiss remains…]. What is the difference between possible and necessary existence? [AT VII 116-117, starting near the end of 116]. How does Descartes distinguish the case of a triangle, or a horse, from that of God? Why, supposing that the idea of a supremely perfect body contained existence, could we not infer that this (supremely perfect) body exists? [AT VII 118]. According to Descartes, what may we conclude about the case of a “supremely powerful being”? [AT VII 119].

(2) In the section On Meditation Six, we see (at AT VII 200; p. 107) an objection raised regarding the ‘real distinction between the mind and the body’ posed in the Sixth Meditation.

Why, according to the objector, has Descartes failed to establish the “the mind can be completely and adequately understood apart from the body”? [AT VII 201-203; quote is from the objector]. What is Descartes’ response on this issue? [AT VII 224-227].

Guidance questions: What is the distinction between genus and species, as posed by the objector, and how does this apply to the case of mind and body? [AT VII 201]. How does the case of the right triangle (used as an analogy by the objector) work to illustrate his point? [AT VII 201-202; top of p. 109]. What should we (according to the objector) conclude? [AT VII 203]. According to Descartes, when one ‘clearly and distinctly understands one thing apart from another’, what is being distinguished? [AT VII 226]. How does this apply to the case of the triangle? [AT VII 224]. Finally, how is the case of the triangle and its properties distinguished from the mind and the body? [AT VII 224-225; see also AT VII 444-447, pp. 113-114].

(3) According to Kant, “all moral philosophy rests entirely on its pure part and, applied to the human being, it does not borrow the least thing from our acquaintance with him (anthropology)” [4:389]. What is his argument, leading up to this claim? Consider…

On Kant’s account, what is the distinction between rational cognition that is material, and rational cognition that is formal? [4:387]. What is the “twofold” distinction he applies to material philosophy? [4:387]. What does he mean by “empirical” and why, on his view, can’t logic have an empirical part? [4:387]. Why, on the other hand, does he say natural and moral philosophy both have an empirical part? [4:387-388]. What does he say distinguishes “pure” philosophy from “empirical”, and how is this distinction applied to the material/formal distinction? [4:388]. How is the pure/empirical distinction applied to the “twofold” distinction mentioned earlier? [4:388]. Why does he think that a “metaphysics of morals” must be “carefully cleansed of everything empirical”? [4:388-399]. What sort of connection might be drawn between Kant’s discussion, regarding a moral law “if it is to hold morally,” and his earlier discussion of logic? [4:387, 4:389]