State of Defense Forces

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WRITER:
Respond to TWO peers post regarding the Issues for Discussion. Each response should be a one or two paragraph (1/2 page each) narrative that either supports, extends or counters another student’s initial post. The instructor is looking for you to add to the discussion. Posts that simply agree with another student add little to no value. If you agree with a fellow student, say so and then amplify their comments with something that is pertinent and relevant. If you disagree, politely say so and then provide some coherent amplification as to why. Post should include complete and coherent concepts that exhibit graduate-level critical thinking. Posts should be probing, insightful, robust, and demonstrate both critical thinking and an understanding of the key concepts.
Your post should demonstrate your understanding of the issue being discussed and express higher-level thought (i.e., stimulate discussion). Generally, you should provide two or more substantial paragraphs for each issue. To be clear, the discussion is about substance and not volume. Your instructor will generally look for four key components in your initial posts:

1. Do you answer the question(s) being asked? Note that some questions have multiple parts.
2. Does your answer demonstrate an understanding of the theory, principles, or key information presented in the course material?
3. Do you provide relevant and accurate examples where applicable?
4. Do you add something insightful to the discussion (i.e., your own thoughts, opinions, experiences, and even your questions)?
   The lesson reading(s) have been provided in a separate attachment.

Issue for Discussion # 1: Marine Corps forces fight as MAGTFs. MEUs are generally organized, equipped, and trained to fight as an integrated MAGTF, yet recent employment of ARG/MEUs by geographic combat commands (GCCs) has tended to focus on disaggregated/distributed operations. Should the Marine Corps further adjust its approach to organizing, equipping, and training ARG/MEUs to facilitate their disaggregated deployment and employment? In other words, instead of the ARG/MEU deploying simultaneously on three ships and then disaggregating, the ARG/MEU deploys as individual ships and then aggregates as a full MAGTF when/if required. What would be the advantages/disadvantages of doing so? What are the implications to organizing, equipping, training, and embarking MEUs?
PEER’S RESPONSE #1: (Alex)

The concept of deploying individually and aggregating only when needed would, at first glance, be keeping with the increased focus on distributed operations. One immediately apparent advantage is preventing concentration of forces that could result in losses being greater in the event of conflict than if they had been disaggregated. However, the flip side of that coin is that each individual ship would be less capable, especially if the combined-arms capabilities are lessened or even eliminated based on which units are placed on which ships. There is also the potential issue of new ships themselves being required to ensure even distribution of combined-arms capabilities. Ultimately, while distributed operations are an important consideration, they do not outweigh the benefits of a standing MAGTF especially when weighed against the costs of reduced capabilities and potentially degraded command and control.
Issue for Discussion #2: Stand-in Forces are defined as “small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary.” What changes to current capabilities and what new capabilities are required to build this force for the Marine Corps? In answering, consider both the potential operations performed (reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, sea denial, etc.) and the enablers (logistics, communications, force protection, etc.) required by Stand-in Forces.
PEER’S RESPONSE #2: (Michale)
In order for the Marine Corps to best meet the requirements of Stand-in Forces (SIF) there are two capabilities constant across the Marine Corps that need to be developed. The first is reconnaissance capabilities, second, is anti-armor capabilities specifically to be used by light infantry. Equally important, if not more important to these capabilities is the MEFs must stop being identical and must be tailored to address the threats in their specific battlespace.
In order for the Marine Corps to be an effective SIF one of their primary tasks are reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance. While the Reconnaissance Battalions are incredible capabilities, they are not enough to provide situational awareness across entire commands. There need to be similar capabilities disaggregated to lower levels throughout the MARDIVs and MAWs. With regards to the second capability, there is no doubt that the “lightness” the Marine Corps has transitioned to in the last few years makes our forces easily deployable which is beneficial, all of our major adversaries per National Defense Strategy (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran) all rely on mechanized forces and most use iterations of Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) tactics. In order to have a survivable force as we transition on the conflict continuum, we have to be able to address those threats more efficiently than current capabilities. Based on our current structure for example number of javelins, or attack aircraft, they are not of the magnitude necessary for us to gain and maintain critical sea-lanes in support of buying time for maritime and other follow-on forces. Lastly, the MEFs have had similar force structures since their design in the 60’s. That being said the threat, terrain, and capabilities of a Russian threat are different enough from a South China Sea and China threat. Therefore, the MEFs must develop capabilities specific to their battlespace. For example, both III MEF and I MEF support the Pacific theater; III MEF, as an entity who would exist in the contact layer, should focus on developing low signature communications methods to use satellite or pre-established communication networks to “hide in the noise”. On the other hand, I MEF, would be part of the blunt layer and needs to develop more robust amphibious insert platforms whether that be assault support aircraft that could operate with low signatures or naval insertion capabilities. We cannot continue to use a one size fits all solutions.